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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ALLEN G. TENWOLDE,

Case No. 950406-CA

vs.

Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

properly

lies

in the Utah

Court

of

Appeals

pursuant to § 78-2A-3(2)(f), U.C.A., as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue Presented:
Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that the
prior decision of the Drivers License Division (the "division") to
take

no

action

regarding

the defendant?s/appellantfs

driver's

license for driving under the influence of alcohol constitutes
jeopardy of punishment, thus barring a second prosecution

for

driving under the influence of alcohol under § 41-6-44, U.C.A.,
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, and
Article One, Section 12, Utah State Constitution.
Standard of Review:
The decision of the trial court was based upon an agreed set
of facts.

Therefore, the issue before this court involves review

of the trial court's determinations of law.

Such matters are

reviewed under a "correctness" standard, wherein the "appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any
degree to the trial judge f s determination of law."

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
Preservation of Issue for Review:
The

issue

presented

was

preserved

for

appellate

pursuant to a plea of guilty to a class B misdemeanor.
was taken under Rule ll(i), Utah Rules
conditioned

upon

the

defendant

of

Criminal

(hereinafter

review

The plea

Procedure,
referred

and
to

as

"appellant") being allowed to appeal the prior decision of the
court denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss asserting the issue of
double jeopardy, pursuant to stipulation (R. 132) and court order
dated June 22, 1995 (R. 134).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES, ORDINANCES
RULES AND REGULATIONS
A.

The

following

constitutional

application in this matter.
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provisions

have

direct

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
. . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . .
The Utah State Constitutional provision, Article One, Section
12, likewise states in pertinent part:
. . • nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
B.

Statutory Provisions, copies of which are appended hereto

are as follows:
Section
Section
Section
Section

41-6-44, Utah Code
Annotated
41-6-44.10, Utah Code
Annotated
53-3-223, Utah Code
Annotated
53-3-227, Utah Code
Annotated
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is from the decision of the trial court denying
appellant's

Motion

to

Dismiss

asserting

the

issue

of

double

jeopardy (R. 120).
The claim of double jeopardy is based upon the fact that prior
to

the

criminal

prosecution

in

the

Third

Circuit

Court

the

appellant had appeared for the purpose of a "per se" hearing before
the

Drivers

License

Division

regarding
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suspension

of

the

appellant's driver's license pursuant to § 53-3-223, U.C.A.

As a

consequence of the "per se" hearing, the division determined to
"take no action" and not suspend the appellant's driver's license
(R. 47-50).
Subsequent to the division's action but prior to the scheduled
trial date the appellant moved to dismiss the prosecution in the
Third

Circuit

Court

based

upon

grounds

of

double

jeopardy,

asserting that the "per se" hearing amounted to jeopardy upon a
first prosecution thereby barring a second prosecution for the same
offense

pursuant

to the Fifth Amendment

of the United

States

Constitution and Article One, Section 12, Utah State Constitution.
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 28), supported by memorandum (R.
30).
On or about April 29, 1995 the trial court issued its Decision
on Motion to Dismiss, denying the motion (R. 120).

Thereafter,

pursuant to stipulation, the appellant entered a plea to Count I of
the Information as amended, driving under the influence of alcohol
pursuant to § 41-6-44, U.C.A., a class B misdemeanor, said plea
being conditioned upon reservation of the right of appellant to
appeal the decision of the court with respect to the issue of
double jeopardy, entered on or about April 18, 1995, pursuant to

Rule ll(i), Utah Rules

of Criminal

887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994).

Procedure

and State

v.

Montoiia.

(Stipulation, R. 132; Order, R. 134.)
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This

stipulation

and

order

merely

acknowledge

and

further

memorialize the proceedings before the court as indicated in the
docket entry of May 26, 1995, ". . . Def COP pursuant to State v
Sery. . . . "

(R. 142).

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following statement of facts is taken from appellant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 30-91).

The State

stipulated to the facts as set forth therein (R. 94).
In or about October 8, 1994 the appellant was arrested in Salt
Lake Count by a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy and cited for
driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to § 41-6-44,
U.C.A.

Pursuant to said citation, the appellant was given notice

of intent to suspend his Utah driver's license pursuant to § 53-3223, U.C.A., by the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License
Division (R. 44).
On or about November 2, 1994, appellant, through his counsel,
appeared for the purpose of this "per se" hearing.

Neither the

arresting officer nor any witnesses appeared on behalf of the state
at the informal hearing.
including, Inter

alia,

The hearing officer received evidence,

the officers1 reports, notice of citation,

and an accident report dated October 8, 1994, (R. 47-50).
of

the

record

of

the

division's

proceedings,

Conclusions is appended hereto in the appendix.
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A copy

Findings

and

Pursuant to letter dated November 2, 1994, the Drivers License
Division decided to "take no action" and did not suspend, deny or
revoke appellant's driving privilege (R. 52).
An Information was filed on or about December 12, 1994, in the
trial court relating to the same offense which had come before the
Drivers License Division, said Information alleging, inter alia,
D.U.I, with injury, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to § 41-6-44,
U.C.A. and Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Injury Accident,
pursuant to § 41-6-31, U.C.A., (R. 1-3).
On or about February 21, 1995, appellant filed a Motion to
Dismiss Count I of the Information (D.U.I, with injury) on the
basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and Article One, Section 12, Utah State
Constitution (R. 28-91).

The state responded with a memorandum in

opposition thereto on or about March 14, 1995 (R. 94-115).

The

issues were submitted on briefs without argument and the trial
court denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss by Memorandum Decision
on or about April 18, 1995 (R. 120-125).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Drivers License Division pursuant to § 533-223, U.C.A., is the functional equivalent of a first prosecution
for D.U.I, subjecting appellant to punishment.
thereby placed in jeopardy.

The appellant was

A second prosecution for the same
Page 6

offense under § 41-6-44, U.C.A., is therefore barred by the Fifth
Amendment

of

the United

States Constitution

and Article One,

Section 12, Utah State Constitution.
ARGUMENT
The hearing before of the Drivers License Division is the
functional equivalent of a first prosecution.
A
subsequent trial for the same offense is a separate
proceeding barred by the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article One, Section 12, Utah
State Constitution.

A.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY GENERALLY

The

Fifth

Amendment

of

United

the

States

Constitution

(reference to which hereinafter also includes Article One, Section

12, Utah State

Constitution)

provides as follows:

No . . .person (shall) be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. . . .
The so-called Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second
prosecution

for

the

same

offense

after

acquittal,

a

second

prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple
punishments for the same offense.

See, North

Carolina

v.

Pierce,

395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L.Ed 2d, 656, 89 S. Ct., 2072 (1969).

The

text of the Amendment mentions only harm to "life or limb", however
it is well settled that the Amendment covers imprisonment, monetary
sanctions, and other penalties.

See, e.g.,
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Ex Parte

Lang,

18 Wall

163, 21 L.Ed 872 (1874); United

States

v. Halper.

490 U.S. 435, 104

L.Ed 2d 487, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
The
guaranty

Double

Jeopardy

which

applies

Benton

Amendment.

v.

Clause
to

the

Maryland.

of

the

States

Fifth

Amendment

through

the

is a

Fourteenth

395 U.S. 784, 794, 23 L.Ed 2d 707,

89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969).
B.

RECENT
U.S.
JEOPARDY.

SUPREME

COURT

DECISION

REGARDING

DOUBLE

Until relatively recently, civil sanctions were not considered
to be punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
One Assortment

of 89 Firearms.

See, e.g., U.S.

465 U.S. 354 (1984).

position was clearly abandoned in United

States

However, that

v. Halyer,

435 (1989), which held that "the labels ?criminal1 and
not

paramount

in

determining

whether

a

v.

sanction

f

490 U.S.
civil 1 are

constitutes

punishment for double jeopardy purposes":
The notion of punishment, as we understand it,
cuts across the division between the civil and
the criminal law, and for the purposes of
assessing whether a given sanction constitutes
multiple
punishment
the
Double
Jeopardy
Clause, we must follow the notion where it
leads.
U.S.

v.

Halver.

490 U.S. 447-448.

The new test for determining whether a sanction, regardless of
how

it

is

labelled,

civil,

quasi-criminal,

Page 8

or

otherwise,

constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, is stated as
follows:
A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either
retributive
or
deterrent
purposes,
is
punishment. . . .
Id.

at 448.
The Supreme Court reasserted this holding four years later in

the context of the Eighth Amendment's provision against excessive
fines and forfeitures in Austin
(1993).

Under

Austin,

to

v.

United

determine

States,
whether

113 S. Ct. 2801
a

forfeiture

constitutes 'punishment1, the court looks at the entire scope of
the statute which the government seeks to employ rather than to the
characteristics of the specific property the government seeks to
forfeit.
Holding a contraband tax hearing to be separate and penal in
nature, and therefor the subject of jeopardy, in Montana
of

Revenue

v.

Kurth

Ranch,

Department

511 U.S. 128, 128 L.Ed 2d 767, (1994),

the United States Supreme Court again reasserted that "the labels
'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance". Kurth,
L. Ed 2d at 777, citing United
In Kurth

Ranch

States

v.

Halver,

128

supra.

the Supreme Court evaluated the entire scope of

a Montana statute, which sought to tax the possession and storage
of dangerous drugs and sustained dismissal of a subsequent "tax"
Page 9

assessment for substantially the same misconduct on double jeopardy
grounds.

The

holding

in Kurth

Ranch

is

that

under

certain

circumstances civil penalties, in that case a tax on marijuana
possession imposed by state statute, may constitute a punishment
for

purposes

of

Jeopardy Clause.

analysis

under

the

Fifth

Amendment's

In finding the civil assessment to be barred by

a previous criminal trial on double jeopardy grounds, Kurth
Halyer

Double

affirms

and advances considerations under which a civil penalty may

be characterized as punitive.
The court stated in Kurth Ranch that criminal sanctions, civil
penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain aspects
in common: some generate governmental revenues, all impose certain
burdens

on

individuals

(often

physical),

and

deter

certain

behavior. "All of these sanctions are subject to constitutional
restraints."

Kurth,

128 L.Ed 2d at 778.

One of these constraints, of course, is the issue of double
jeopardy which is discussed thoroughly in the Kurth

case.

The Supreme Court' s analysis of the Montana forfeiture tax
statute discusses several features of the Montana statute which set
it apart from a mere revenue raising statute.

The fact that one

proceeding was denoted as 'civil' and the other 'criminal' was not
among the factors considered.

The court states,

First, this so-called tax is conditioned on
the commission of a crime. That condition is
Page 10

"significant of penal and prohibitory intent
rather than the gathering of revenue". . . .
In this case the tax assessment not only
hinges on the commission of a crime, it is
also exacted only after the tax payor has been
arrested for the precise conduct that gives
rise to the tax obligation in the first place.
Taxes imposed upon illegal activities are
fundamentally different from taxes with a pure
revenue raising purpose that are imposed
despite their adverse effect on the taxed
activity. But they differ as well from mixed
motive taxes that governments impose both to
deter a disfavored activity and to raise money
(such as with the tax on cigarettes and
tobacco). . . . These justifications vanish
when
the
taxed
activity
is
completely
forbidden, for the legitimate revenue raising
purpose that might support such a tax could be
equally well served by increasing the fine
imposed upon conviction.
The
(administrative)
proceedings
Montana
initiated to collect a tax on the possession
of drugs was the functional equivalent of a
successive criminal prosecution that placed
the Kurths in jeopardy a second time for "the
same offense".
Id.
114 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
(emphasis added.)
The considerations which the court

in Kurth

found

to be

relevant were (1) the high tax rate specified by the statute, (2)
the statute's purpose of deterring unlawful activity, and the fact
(3) that the tax is conditioned upon commission of crime, (4) is
exacted only after taxpayer's arrest for conduct giving rise to tax
obligation, and

(5) is levied on goods, which the taxpayer no

longer owns or possess. Under these conditions, the Montana tax on
confiscated

marijuana

violated

the

Page 11

Double

Jeopardy

Clause's

protection

against

successive

punishments

when

imposed

in

proceeding subsequent to taxpayer's drug prosecution.
The court in Kurth

held that Montanaf s tax law was

Ranch

fairly characterized as a punishment.

Applying the arguments made

there to the circumstances presented here, it is obvious that a
ninety days or one year driver's license suspension is intended at
least in part to be a deterrent and penalty, i.e., a punishment for
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
solely

remedial,

as

is

required

under

It certainly is not
Hal per

to

escape

characterization of punishment under the Fifth Amendment.

the

Halver,

490 U.S. 447-448.
It is not claimed here that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
cumulative punishments imposed in a single proceeding.

Punishments

may

forfeiture,

be

a

consecutive

combination
terms

incarceration, etc.

in

of

incarceration,

prison,

See, United

(7th Cir. 1994) at 1464.

and
States

fine,

consecutive

terms

of

v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463

Indeed, Utah State statutes provide that

if a conviction arises for D.U.I., suspension for 90 days on a
first offense is part of the automatic sanction which will be
imposed by the division.

Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.

The division's

decision letter to the appellant makes this clear (R. 52).
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The problem
hearings,

each

is that there were separate proceedings, two

of which

producing

the potential

for

separate

punishment for a single offense.
As noted in Torres

at 1465,

But if as Kurth Ranch holds a civil proceeding
to collect a monetary penalty for crime counts
as an independent "jeopardy" it does not
require much imagination to see the problem.
Civil and criminal proceedings are not only
docketed separately but also tried separately,
and under the double jeopardy clause separate
trials are anathema.
Shortly after the decision in Kurth

Ranch,

supra,

See, U.S.

Circuit applied its reasoning to civil forfeitures.
McCaslin,

863

F.

Supp.

1299

(W.D. Wash.

1994),

the Ninth

holding

v.
that

multiple punishments are permissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause only if imposed in the same proceeding and are barred if
imposed

in separate proceedings. See also.

America

v.

$405,089.23

U.S.

Currency.

33 F.3d

United

States

of

1210, (9th Cir.

1994), holding that civil forfeiture proceedings constituted "a
separate proceeding" resulting in convictions for the purpose of
double jeopardy, that the civil forfeiture constituted "punishment"
which triggered protections of double jeopardy and that criminal
prosecution and civil forfeiture action based upon the same offense
had to be brought in the same proceeding.
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C.

THE APPELLANT WAS PLACED IN JEOPARDY AT THE PRIOR HEARING
BEFORE THE DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION.
The Drivers License Division hearing with respect to the

alleged driving under the influence of alcohol of the appellant is
necessarily based upon the same facts and circumstances as would be
the prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol in this
case pursuant to § 41-6-44, U.C.A.

(A copy of § 41-6-44, U.C.A. is

contained in the appendix.)
The statute under which the division attempted to suspend
appellant's

license

is

§

53-3-223,

U.C.A.

(See,

letter

to

defendant, R. 45; a copy of § 53-3-223, U.C.A., is contained in the
appendix.)
Section 53-3-223, U.C.A., provides that if a peace officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be in violation of
§

41-6-44,

U.C.A.,

he

may

request

the

defendant

to

take

a

chemical/alcohol test and, if the accused submits to the test,
thereafter serve notice upon the person of intent to suspend his
license and right to be heard, upon request therefor, within 30
days before the division.

After such hearing the division is

authorized, upon a finding that a "...peace officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving

a motor vehicle in

violation of §41-6-44..." ( § 53-3-223(6)(c)(i), U.C.A.), to suspend
the person's license to drive provided as follows,
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(7)(a). A first suspension, whether ordered or
not challenged under this section, is for a
period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest, (b) A second or
subsequent suspension under this subsection is
for a period of one year, beginning on the
30th day after the date of arrest. 53-3-223,
U.C.A.
The fact that no live witnesses appeared or testified at the
hearing

is of no consequence under Utah law.

Blackstock.

In Cordova

v.

861 P.2d 449, (Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals

reversed the district court's finding that it was not compelled to
hold a trial de novo

where the record of the division failed, in

the trial court's opinion, to satisfy the "residuum
evidence" rule.

of competent

The appellate court held that even though neither

the officers nor the petitioner nor any other witness or person
appeared on behalf of either side at the division's suspension
hearing, the administrative agency, based upon evidence of the
officer's report, test records, and affidavits, was competent to
make a decision with respect to the suspension of Cordova's driving
privileges.

Cordova

further held that the statutory scheme with

respect to suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses provides
for "informal adjudicative proceedings", reviewable by trial
novo

de

only, and that the decision of the administrative agency based

solely

upon

the

arrest

record

and

affidavits

and

documents

submitted was competent to constitute basis for a decision, i.e.,
it was a "hearing".

Therefore, the appellant was clearly placed in
Page 15

jeopardy of having his license suspended at the hearing before the
division.
It makes no difference that in this case the appellant was not
"punished" as a result of the "per se" hearing.

A finding of "no

action" constitutes former jeopardy to the same extent as if the
division had

taken the appellant's

license.

This serves

the

underlying purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause - - protecting a
person who has been acquitted from having to "run the gauntlet" a
second time.
D.

Ashe

v.

Swenson.

397 U.S. 442, 446 (1970).

SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY.
The suspension of the driver's license is clearly a "penalty".

Ninety days without a driver's license is obviously in the nature,
at least to a substantial degree, of a sanction and a penalty.
This is reinforced by the fact that a second such incident would
result in suspension for the period of a full year as set forth in
§ 53-3-223(7)(b), U.C.A.

Greater punishment is applied if one

fails to learn the lesson the first time.
The

sanctions

imprisonment, etc.

imposed

by

§

41-6-44,

U.C.A.,

) take place separately and wholly independent

from § 53-3-223, U.C.A.

The penalty under Title 53 is imposed

regardless of the outcome at trial under Title 44.
license

(fine,

suspension, however,

is mandated

Section 41-6-44(12), U.C.A., states:
Page 16

under

The driver's

both sections.

(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223, if the
previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction
is based.
The additional penalty of 90 days/one year license suspension as a
consequence of violating § 41-6-44 as provided in section (12),
lends weight to the argument that this is a punishment in addition
to fines and jail time.
The legislature's own statement applicable at the time of this
offense that the

"primary purpose" of the suspension

statutes

pursuant to Title 53 relating to D.U.I.fs is "protecting persons on
highways by quickly removing from the highways those persons who
have shown they are safety hazards", § 53-3-222, U.C.A., prior to
1995 amendment, leaves latitude for the other obvious purposes,
e.g., deterrence, retribution and punishment.

Indeed, speaking to

the issue of summary suspensions, the United States Supreme Court
stated,

!l

[f]irst, the very existence of the summary sanction of the

statute serves as a deterrent to drunken driving."
Montrym,

Mackev

v.

443 U.S. 1 at 18 (1979).

If the 90 day/one year suspension were not a deterrent and
punishment, there would be no reason, in practice, for a D.U.I,
defendant to plead to the "lesser" charge of reckless driving, §
41-6-45, U.C.A.,

which carries no license
Page 17

suspension

penalty.

Since it is deemed a first offense on a second or subsequent
conviction

for

D.U.I,

pursuant

to

§

41-6-44(9)(b),

the

only

advantage to such a reduced charge plea is avoidance of sanctions,
often the same fine and/or jail time but without the 90 day/one
year suspension.

An optimum scenario for the D.U.I, defendant is

to "win" the per se hearing and plead to an "alcohol related"
reckless

driving,

thus

preserving

the

driving

privilege

and

escaping the substantial penalty of loss of the driving privilege,
regardless of whether the court levies the same fine and/or jail as
it would for a D.U.I.
In this society where public transportation is either nonexistent or is, at best, inadequate and entire commercial shopping
areas are located in suburbs surrounding our cities, we can no
longer view a driver's license as merely a privilege which is given
by the State and which is subject to revocation at any time.
Having a driver's license has now taken on greater meaning.

A

driver's license is a substantial right which may not be deprived
without due process.
In

enacting

§

53-3-223, U.C.A.,

the

legislature

clearly

intended at least in part to institute a penalty designed to deter
drunk driving in contemplation of swift punishment.

Section 53-3-

223, U.C.A., is, at the very least, partly punitive as it acts to
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punish

individual

conduct,

focusing

on

the

culpability

of

a

specific driver, rather than serving general remedial purposes.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Kurth

the appellant asserts that

the prosecution under Count I of the amended Information is the
"functional equivalent of successive criminal prosecution" placing
the defendant in jeopardy a second time "for the same offense."
Kurth

at 782.

Clearly, § 53-3-227, U.C.A., provides for (1) a

separate proceeding, and (2) a punishment.

As such, it amounts to

jeopardy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of Article One, Section 12 of the
Utah State

Constitution

same activity.

should also be held to be violated by this

The Utah State Supreme Court has specifically held

that the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy affords a
criminal defendant three separate protections by prohibiting (1) a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
multiple punishments for the same offense.
P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), citing

State

v.

Miller,

State

v.

Trafny.

799

747 P.2d 400 (Utah

1987).
The decision in Kurth
decisions such as Simms v.

Ranch

requires Utah courts to revisit

Tax Commission,

841 P. 2d 6 (Utah 1992),

which incidently concedes that proceedings such as that for the
Page 19

revocation of an individual's driving privilege, is like a criminal
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against
the law, and is "quasi

criminal in character".

The trial court's conclusion that the department's decision
not to suspend the appellant's driver's license was not a prior
separate proceeding subjecting him to punishment should be reversed
and remanded with directions for the trial court to set aside the
appellant's conviction and grant the appellant's motion on double
jeopardy grounds.
DATED this ***~T{

day of LJ^^^^^f

, 1995.

BULLEN
:torney for Defendant/Appellant
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
Findings of Proceedings
Date of
Hearing

Time Set
For Heanng

November 0 2 , 9 k

9 : 0 0 AH

Name and Address of Attorney
TTArRrh^l

Name and Address of Dnver
A l l e n G a r r e t t Tenwolde

2749 P a r l e y s Way
1 S a l t Lake C x t y , Utah 84109

Date of Birth

11/14/1966

Witness
1 S y l v i a L.

Stewart

Magna

Dep^ Dwayne Anjewielrd

DL Number

146388879

Date of Arrest
October 0 8 , 1 9 9 4

Magna

Witness
| Marie Eklund

Arresting Officer

8689 West E d i t h Dr.
Magna, Utah 84044

RUIIPTL

Heanng Officer
Paul T. F i n l i n s o n

Location of Hearing
Rose Park D r i v e r L i c e n s e Div

Agency

Salt Lake Sheriff 0

Dep.

Witness
Nielsen
R.

Dep.

Witness
K. M a t t i n g l y

OPENING STATEMENT
This hearing is being conducted at the dnver's request in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and
(3

53-3-223 U C A , following his/her arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs

•

41-6-44 4 U C A , following his/her arrest for driving with measurable alcohol in the body.

•

41-6-44 6 U.C A , following his/her arrest for dnving with measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a
controlled substance in the body.

The issues to be determined are If the peace officer had'grounds to believe the driver violated U C A 41-6-44/32A12-209/41-6-44 6, if the dnver was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and the test results
All formalities required in court proceedings need not be used m this hearing However, the Division shall substantially
comply with the fundamental rules of due process Sworn testimony will be taken and the parties may have witnesses
testify. The driver may testify and may cross examine others who testify
If the license is denied or suspended, the driver has the right within 30 days, to petition the proper court for an appeal
heanna
Those testifying will be sworn and the hearing shall proceed.
<•*##****#*

The following documents and information are part of the records for this hearing:
Yes

No

Q

•

Oc

a

Dc

G

Heanng request made within ten days.

a
a

•

Record of test results, if any

a

Operational checklist of test instrument

DI-1006
Rev 4-94

The officer's report submitted in compliance with Utah Code Ann 53-3-223/41-6-44 4/41-6-44 6
Notice and citation served by the officer of the Department's intent to deny/suspend and information on
how to receive a heanng by the Department

Blood t e s t

pending?

V7

02/06/9*5
Yes

11:34 FAX 801 964,

0)004

Ut.DriverLicense

No

N/A
Lg(one|H

Department of Public Safety affidavit that indicates the breath testing instrument was checked in
accordance with standards set forth in 41-6-44 3 U C A.
Other (i e., Documents and/or information received in behalf of the dnver and/or other evidence received
which is made official record for the purpose of this hearing).
Explain 1 . A c c i d e n t Report C# 94-L36130 on 10/0B/1994 by Dep. R. N i e l s e n . 2 Pages
2

TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED
Supplemental
R e p o r t . 3 Pages•

%

1 Sworn testimony of officer
Deputy Dwayne Anjewierden, SLCSO
a. Following are the facts and conclusions presented by the peace officer leading to belief that the party had been
u driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a
»* combination of alcohol and any drug or with measurable alcohol, controlled substance or metabolite in the body.
Deputy An/jewieraen, SLCsCT, a i d n o t appear.

b The driver was placed under arrest

Yes C2

No D

The dnver was requested to submit to a chemical test
c

Yes C3

No LJ

The dnver was advised pnor to the chemical test that the test results could result in denial/suspension of his/her
driving privilege
Yes D

No

D

The dnver refused to submit to chemical test' Yes C^l
d

Charge(s) V i o l a t i o n o f 41-6-44 UCA

No D

Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so Yes Q]

No LJ

e Proper Department procedure and rules were foliowed by the peace officer m the administration of the chemical
test.

Yes •

No D

(1) Evidence and/or information was received indicatina the test machine was Q

was not Q

properly working.

(2)The dnver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer showing a test result of

Pending?
LJ
CD

_% alcohol,

Controlled substance,
Metabolite of a controlled substance.

2. Testimony by witness officer or other witness(es) Name* None Taken

2

F'fCY

02/06/9-5

11:35

FAX 801 96

Ut.DrlverLicense

@005

3. Substance of testimony or evidence by driver or witness(es): Allen Garrett Tenwolde DOB: 11/14/1966
The Driver didnot appear. No reason known.

4. Substance of statement and/or questions by driver's legal counsel:

In Behalf.

Herschel

Bullen>

Attorney

Council did appear.

PRESIDING OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW:
A. The peace officer had reason to believe that the driver had
209/41*6-44.6 and was arrested for the same.
B. The driver was EH

was not D

had not

•

violated.U.Q.Ar41 -6-44/32A-12-

advised of the possible denial/suspension/revocation of his/her driving privilege,

C. After proper warning, the driver did D
D. The chemical test was •

•

was not

did not •
D

submit to a chemical test.

administered by an officer/medical person certified to do so.

E. Proper procedures and standards were
were not Q followed by the peace officer to insure the operation of
the test machine to be reliable, with the results of p^n-r^g?
%.
F. Test results indicate O

a controlled substance •

metabolite of a controlled substance.

3

/ //0

02/OP,/95

u : as

FAX 801 <K • 44

Ut.DriverLicense

@006

G, Departme it of Public Safety affidavit indicated the breath testing instrument used w a s N 0 was not Q
in proper working order according to Department Standards (UCA 41-6-44.3).

reliable and

H. All procedures and requirements were (U were not •
followed by the reporting officer pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3223. 41-6-44.4 or 41-6-44.6. (Explain what procedures were not followed, if any):

I.

Officer did •

did not 0

Reasons (non-appearance):

appear
Deputy Bwayiie'Aiijewierden,

SLCSO, d i d n o t a p p e a r . No r e a s o n known*

J. Additional findings of fact not covered above:

CONCLUSIONS:
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE
STATUTORY " PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO DENY/SUSPEND/REVOKE THE DRIVING
PRIVILEGE WERE Q WERE NOT Q PROVIDED IN THIS CASE/ AND THE FOLLOWING
DECISION IS RENDERED:

a

To deny, suspend or revoke the driving
privilege by authority of Utah Code Ann.
53-3-223, 41-6-44.4 or 41-6-44.6.

0

Take No Action:
Explain: Deputy Dwavne A n i e w i e r d e n
SLCSO. d i d n o t a p p e a r . #14

Comments ly Presiding Officer.

Presiding Officer::

Reviewed bit

Z&

Title>^^<

/^

tiJl^^^LJkniHS^/

APPENDIX B

§ 41-6-44

41-6-29

100

MOTOR VEHICLES

Each local authority shall pay for providing, training, and supervising
schooNjrossing guards in accordance with this section.
History: C ? J53, 41-6-20.1, e n a c t e d by L.
(2)(a)(ii) as Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(J
:pde1992, ch. 91, §
leted former Subsection (2)(b), the suj^slance of
994, ch. 66, § 1; 1994, c h .
120, § 53.
which was incorporated into Subsection (2)(a)
by the addition of "after written jrssurance by a
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s ^ ^ - The 1994 amendlocal authority that the local* authority will
ment by ch. 66} effective iHay 2, 1994, deleted
comply with Subsections (3f and (4)"; redesig"Before J a n u a r y 1, 1993" froS^the beginning of
nated the subsections iri Subsection (3) and
Subsection (2); deleted former Subsection
deleted former S u b s e m o n (3)(b), which read
(2)(b), adding comparable languagl^to the end
"Notwithstanding Subsection (a)(ii)(B) the deof Subsection (2)(a); deleted former Subsection
partment shall ar'bvide for the maintenance of
(3)(b), which provided for the maintenance of
reduced speed^chool zones for state highways
reduced speed school zones for state highways
as requirecLtfhder Section 41-6-21"; substituted
as required under Section 41-6-21; addea
"Department of Transportation" for "Transporproviso at the end of Subsection (3)(b)(ii); addecl
^ation/^Commission" in Subsection (6); and
Subsection (3)(c); and made related changes.
$fe stylistic changes,
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective
i* section is set out as reconciled by the
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before J a n u a r y 1,
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); r e d e s - ^ O f f i c e ^ f Legislative Research and General
ignated former Subsections (2)(a)(i) aptf
Counsel

/

TICLE 4
ACCIDENTS

/

41-6-29. Opei^rtor's duty at accident
Pjmalty.

Stop jrtaccident —

y
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti.
> 4 n order for the state to establish corpus
^delicti, tfag stoii;.mjjffliwantinhlinh r i J rlrnr nnri
convincing evidence that the person who left

the scene was in fact the driver of the veSicle
and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansel!
• 007 PjPd 078 (Utnh f?t iW

m

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
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(b) The fact t h a t a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise t h a t degree of care that an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more t h a n 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less t h a n 24 hours nor more
t h a n 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed within six years
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more t h a n 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less t h a n 80 hours nor more
t h a n 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two
prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and
(7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for
violations committed after April 23, 1990.

41-6-44
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less t h a n 240 nor
more t h a n 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less t h a n $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less t h a n 720 hours nor more t h a n 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less t h a n 240 nor
more t h a n 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term
closely supervised follow through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23, 1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less t h a n
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less t h a n 720 hours
nor more t h a n 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less t h a n 240 nor
more t h a n 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow through after the treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after
July 1, 1993, have been completed;
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(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
after July 1, 1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 t h a t qualifies as
a prior conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 t h a t qualifies as a prior conviction under
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first,
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior
conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-6-45 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for
the record t h a t there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 t h a t is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and
(7).
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(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943,
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1994 amend57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, ment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994,
§ l;1967,ch.88,§ 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977,added Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B), making related
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983,
"41-2-130" in Subsection (12)(b).
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12)(a),
1987, ch. 138, § 37;1987(lstS.S.),ch.8,§ 2; substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsection (12)(b), and made stylistic changes.
1988, c h . 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990,
c h . 2 9 9 , § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, c h . 168,
This section is set out as reconciled by the
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; Office of Legislative Research and General
1994, c h . 159, § 1; 1994, c h . 263, § 1.
Counsel.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Searches.
In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, including the concern of the police about the dissipa-

tion of blood alcohol and the possible loss or
corruption of that evidence, justified a warrantless search of defendant's home. City of Orem v.
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

iQ-44.3.—Slandaids for chemical breatlrarariy*
dence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Failure to c o m p l y with%tandards.
Failure to comply fully witirk^andards established by the Department of Publf&Safety does
not necessarily make breath test evm^nce inadmissible. It simply means that the foti

tion and validity of the^^vTdence may not be
presumed, but rathe&^ffat they will have to be
established in orarer for the evidence to be
admitted. S a h ^ a k e City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d
443 (UtabrfSfApp. 1993).

41-6-44.6. Definitions — Drjp^Sg with any measurable
controlled substaiice i ^ t h e body — Penalties —
Arrest withou^warrant.
(1) As used in this sec
(a) "Controlled^iUbstance" means any substance scheduled under Section 5 8 - 3 7 - V ^
(b) "Pr^utioner" has the same meaning as provided in Sec^tei 58-37-2.
(cl^^rescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section o8^37-2.
J$5 "Prescription'* has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-
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41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning,
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe t h a t person to have
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered.
(ii) If an officer requests more t h a n one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select
the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit
to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not
immediately request t h a t the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of
the Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing
before the Driver License Division.
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(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after
the date of the arrest, t h a t he had grounds to believe the arrested person
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or
while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a
controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6,
and t h a t the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under
Subsection (1).
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a
hearing.
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten
days after the date of the arrest.
(hi) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest
for a period of:
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.4, 41-644.6, or 53-3-223, or a conviction after July 1,1993, under Section
41-6-44.
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver
License Division, the hearing shall be documented and shall cover the
issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44,
41-6-44.4, or 44-6-44.6; and
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test.
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized
agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and
papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace
officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in
Section 21-5-4.
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines t h a t the
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division
shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.4,
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or 41-6-44.6, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section
41-6-44.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the
person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14),
a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection
t h a t the revocation was improper.
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License
Division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial.
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering
him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation
does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility
at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4;
1981, ch. 126, § 43; 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 1987,1988, ch. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 21; 1992,
ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, ch. ch. 78, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 2; 1993, ch. 193,
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§ 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, § 35;
1994, ch. 180, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while
having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6"
twice in Subsection (l)(a) and once in Subsection (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-
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44.6, or 53-3-223" for "Section 41-2-130 or 41-644.4" in Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B); inserted "41-644.4, or 44-6-44.6" in Subsection (2)(f)(i);
substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130 or" and
inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in Subsection (2)(h)
(i)(B); and added "or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a
controlled substance in the person's body" at
the end of Subsection (8).

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate
speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed
limits — Emergency power of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or
highway conditions.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections
41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in
Section 41-6-20.1;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district;
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this speed limit does not
impair the ability of the state to qualify for federal highway funds; and
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits
provided in Subsection (2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not
reasonable or prudent and t h a t it is unlawful.
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change
the speed limits on the highways of the state.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, e n a c t e d by L.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 45; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1991, ch. 44,
§ 1; 1992, ch. 91, § 3; 1994, ch. 66, § 2; 1994,
ch. 120, § 54.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1994 amendment by ch. 66, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote
Subsection (2)(a); deleted former Subsection
(4), relating to the rule-making power of the
Transportation Commission; and redesignated

former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective
May 2, 1994, substituted "Subsection (4)" for
"Subsection (5)" in Subsection (2); rewrote Subsection (2)(a); and also deleted former Subsection (4), redesignating former Subsection (5) as
(4).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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53-3-222. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving
under the influence.
The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of this title relating to suspension or revocation of a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle for
driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain level or while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug, or for
refusing to take a chemical test as provided in Section 41-6-44.10, is protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 5; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 137, § 29; C. 1953, 41-2-129; renumbered
by L. 1993, ch. 234, § 101.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 41-2129, substituted "drive" for "operate," deleted
ending language defining safety hazards as the
influence of alcohol or drugs or refusing to take
a chemical test, and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d
778 (Utah 1986).
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53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence —
Temporary license — Hearing and decision —
Suspension and fee — Judicial review,
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may
be violating or has violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a
vehicle with a certain blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving
under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a drug and
alcohol or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section
41-6-44.6, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person,
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar
local ordinance adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render
the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension
or revocation of the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a
blood or breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6, or
if the officer makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the
person is otherwise in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing
administration of the test or making the determination shall serve on the
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to
suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
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(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division he
shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver;
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days;
and
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before
the division.
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the
division, serve also as the temporary license certificate.
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the division indicating the
chemical test results, if any; and
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has
violated Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6.
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The
request to be heard shall be made within ten days of the date of the arrest.
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which
the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that the
hearing may be held in some other county.
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.6;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and
papers;
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace
officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in
Section 21-5-4.
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing.
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the
members of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the
full membership of the division.
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's
license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the
division as required in the notice, the division shall order whether the
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the
date of the arrest.
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
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(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a
fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, which shall be
paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court
decision t h a t the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for
a hearing on the m a t t e r which, if held, is governed by Section 53-3-224.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, ch. 129, § 2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30,
§ 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1; 1993, ch. 205, § 2; C.
1953, 41-2-130; renumbered by L. 1993, ch.
234, § 102; 1994, ch. 180, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while
having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6"
in Subsection (l)(a); inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in
Subsections (2), (3), (5)(d), and (6)(c)(i); and
inserted "21-5-4" in Subsection (6)(d)(ii).

i^3«3 227:—Driving a niuloi vehicle prohibited while \w
\.
cense denied, suspended, disqualified, or JteX^
voked — Penalties.
jT
(1) ANoerson whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked u ^ e r this chapter or under the laws of the state in whioJfhis license
was i s s u e d a n d who drives any motor vehicle upon the highwa^C of this state
while t h a t l ^ n s e is denied, suspended, disqualified, or invoked shall be
punished as proSdded in this section.
JF
(2) A person coraricted of a violation of Subsection (1), amer than a violation
specified in Subsecu^n (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeano^whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is b a ^ d on his driving a motor^ehicle while his license is
suspended, disqualifieH^or revoked for:
jp
(i) a refusal to s u W i t to a chemic^Cest under Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of S ^ t i o n 41-6-44iF
(iii) a violation of a looal ordinance t h a t complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43;^. j r
(iv) a violation of Section j ^ 6 - 4 4 . 6 ;
(v) a violation of Sectior^oN^207;
(vi) a criminal actionJj$at theVerson plead guilty to as a result of
a plea bargain after ha|ffng been orteinally charged with violating one
or more of the sections or ordinancea^nder this subsection;
(vii) a r e v o c a t i i ^ o r suspension wBjch has been extended under
Subsection 53-&K20 (2); or
X
(viii) wheij^Iisqualification is the resuKj)f driving a commercial
motor vetj^te while the person's CDL is cUgqualified, suspended,
canceled^or revoked under Subsection 53-3-4 A Q ) .
(b) A pggson is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whoi^e conviction under
Subsection (1) is based upon his driving a motor vehicle^/hile his license
is sus^fnded, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licelasure for violatioru^orresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (9i
Jt) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at least tfttemaximum
Jme for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301.
X
listory: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 29; C. 1943,
57-4-32; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 8; 1983, ch. 183,

§ 27; C. 1953, 41-2-28; renumbere\by L.
1987, ch. 137, § 36; 1989, ch. 209, § 20^989,

